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Building Judicial Integrity in China 
Hualing Fu1 
 
Judicial reforms aimed at improving  the rule of law and ethical integrity has been 
an ongoing goal of the Chinese government since the late 1970s.  Both rule of law and 
judicial integrity have some unique characteristics in the Chinese context. In the 2010 
Code of Conduct for Judges and 2010 Basic Standards of Professional Ethics for Judges 
in the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court requires judges 
to be loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Constitution, and the law.  
Additionally, judges are required by the Supreme People's Court to be both politically 
reliable and professionally competent.2  
This article addresses the following questions: How has judicial reform 
progressed in the People’s Republic of China and what defines the court in an 
authoritarian state struggling for integrity and the rule of law? Are courts and their judges 
politically independent? Can the law be applied judicially in adjudication?  How 
widespread is judicial corruption in China? Can legal reforms provide at least partial 
remedies to ethical problems that Chinese courts face? In order to answer those questions, 
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we need first to examine the context of China’s ongoing judicial reform. The court is an 
integral part of the county’s political system, and judicial reform cannot take place in 
isolation. Judicial reform, in order to be successful, must be embedded in the larger 
political, bureaucratic, and social contexts from which judges originate and courts 
operate.  
 
Context of Judicial Reform 
Judicial reform in China, as is the case anywhere, does not take place in a vacuum. The 
reform is embedded in a particular political and social context. There are three important 
contextual issues in studying China’s judicial reform. 
First, there is a political context, which affects the parameters of reform. China is 
a one party authoritarian state where the ruling Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) has its 
leadership position entrenched in the Constitution. This allows the CCP to dominate legal 
reform and control judges. The Chinese Constitution is hostile to the doctrine of 
separation of powers, and judicial independence has always been taboo. he political 
domination of the CCP has a significant impact on the independence of the court and the 
judicial process to the degree that the entire judicial framework is absorbed into the 
political process.  
Judges are CCP members first and  judges second. he CCP openly demands that 
courts be secondary to the larger political system, and  the courts willingly comply, and 
an integral part of,. That political-legal community is composed of judges, prosecutors, 
police officers, prison guards, and, of course, lawyers. As members of that larger 
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political-legal community under the direct leadership of the CCP, judges, in principle, are 
first and foremost loyal to the CCP and subject to its instruction and discipline. When 
there is a conflict of demands between CCP instructions and legal requirements, judges 
know exactly where their primary loyalty lies. The CCP’s instructions are more 
consequential than legal requirements in that particular political context in which the 
courts operate.  
Second, the bureaucratic setting of the Chinese courts also impacts the behavior 
of many judges. It is commonly accepted that the prevailing legal practice in China 
permits a degree of independence of adjudication by the court as an institution. However, 
it does not allow the exercise of independent adjudication by judges as individuals. 
3
There is a rigid and rigorous bureaucratic control within the court, and trial judges, often 
placed at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy, must receive multiple approvals before 
making their decision.. It has become a routine criticism that a fatal problem of the 
Chinese judiciary is those who try cases do not have the necessary authority to decide the 
cases. Against the bureaucratic system backdrop, judges tend to behave more like a team 
player in a large assembly line than an individual decision-maker; thus, the system of 
bureaucratic discipline that prevails in China transforms judging into a collective system. 
One of the ongoing judicial reforms is to increase the authority of trial judges in 
rendering decisions; that seemingly innocuous reform has encountered resistance not only 
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from the political authorities outside the court but also from the senior management 
judges within the court. 
4
 
Third, there is a social context in which judges operate.  Judges are one of the 
many professions in China which operate in the same social milieu, and are subject to 
similar incentives that shape their professional behaviors. Social constraints that affect 
the professional behavior of doctors, accountants, educators and others have an equal 
impact on judges. Judicial reform, in building ethical integrity, is constrained by the 
general ethical standard in society . Judicial reform, therefore, has to be embedded in the 
society in which it functions. If the party extends its political control to all state 
institutions and to the fabric of society, it is hard for the courts to resist the political 
overreach on their own. Similarly, if corruption is a prevalent social ill, it is not possible 
for judges to be immune from the disease. Professionalism and ethical integrity are 
systemic issues that rise and fall at a general level.      
These contextual constraints impact the ethical integrity of Chinese judges and 
create powerful institutional barriers to their professional development. It is unsurprising 
that a common perception of Chinese judges is that they are not politically independent 
due to the entrenched leadership of the Communist Party in the PRC legal system. 
Individual judges are directly “accountable” and defer to the bureaucratic system inside 
the courts because judges are akin to cogs in a larger machine, rather than individual 
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judicial decision-makers. Moreover, professional ethics in the judiciary is a microcosm of 
ethical standard in the society at large.   
 
The Possibility of Judicial Integrity in Authoritarian States and its Limits  
China’s authoritarian state strives for the rule of law, in a limited sense, and relies on an 
efficient and effective judiciary for dispute resolution, pronouncing and enforcing rules, 
and limiting local states.
5
 
 Rule of law serves at least three objectives for the party-state. First, it legitimizes 
powers; generations of party and state leaders in China have embraced the concept of rule 
of law. In particular, emerging leaders in the early years of their terms in office tend to 
emphasize the rule of law in their efforts to conquer opposition and win the hearts of the 
ordinary citizens. Without exception, Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang 
Zemin, and Hu Jingtao all embraced the rhetoric of rule of law in the early years of their 
terms in office.
6
 If a political leader lacks charisma or an appealing ideology, they 
regularly resort to the rhetoric of the rule of law while exercising political powers. 
7
  
Second, the central government may rely on the rule of law, and an effective court 
in particular, to rein in local governments. In China’s unitary state, the central 
government encounters a significant asymmetry in information and near insurmountable 
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barriers to the implementation of national policy at the local level.
8
 Resources  for 
monitoring the performance of local officials and ensuring local compliance of central 
policies are limited. There are a limited number of instruments in the central 
government's toolkit to identify, prevent, and punish local defiance. Extra-legal measures, 
through party disciplines against party members, are a commonly-used strategy in 
extending active central control over local governments. The ongoing anti-corruption 
campaign clearly demonstrates that instrument,
9
 along with the party-state’s use of the 
rule of law in conquering local resistance. 
10
 In Yuhua Wang’s words, law can be used to 
tie the hands of petty autocrats.
11
 
Third, the rule of law may have proved to be the most effective mechanism for 
dispute resolution in the long run. China’s rapid social and economic transition has 
produced tremendous stress and generated a large number of disputes.  The party-state 
has resorted to a variety of extra-legal ways to manage those disputes.
12
 Suppression of 
disputes and dispute resolution, that is based on political expedience, have failed 
miserably in achieving effective and fair settlements. As numerous studies on the Chinese 
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petition system has shown, unprincipled dispute resolution that bypasses the legal system 
eventually exacerbates social conflict and becomes a destabilizing force itself. 
13
 There 
was serious soul-searching in the post-Hu era (2002-2012) on the danger of using extra-
law in social control. With the renewed efforts by the CCP’s Central Committee’s Fourth 
Plenum on further development of the legal system, China resumed and broadened the 
reform of building a socialist system.
14
 There is an emerging consensus among political 
elites that dispute resolution, based on the rule of law and legal principles, is the most 
cost-effective way to resolve the vast majority of the cases. 
15
   
Of course, China has demonstrated unique characteristics in its legal development 
that are strongly associated with its political system. Putting China in a historical and 
comparative context, there is strong reason to argue that China is following an East Asian 
Model (EAM) of developmental state.
16
 In that model there is  state-led economic reform 
followed by the development of commercial rule of law to facilitate the market economy. 
At the initial stage, the state promotes civil law rights (such as the freedom of contract) 
and social and economic rights (consumer right, labor right and non-discrimination and 
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equality right), yet limits collective rights and political rights. As the economy grows, the 
state invests more in institutions, trains professionals, improves education, and diverts 
resources to human development. From that stage onward, the state is on the defensive 
and starts to jealously guard its power and privilege, refusing to make further concessions 
unless absolutely necessary. But, by that late stage, the economy has changed, society has 
changed, and people have changed, creating persistent demand for rule of law, 
government accountability, and an expansion of collective and political rights. This is the 
trajectory of incremental growth and managed legal development that China is following.   
China is on the trajectory of that EAM and the legal reforms are taking place 
decisively within the framework of its authoritarian system. There is an inherent tension 
between the necessity to uphold the authoritarian rule and the imperative to live up to the 
party’s own rhetoric. An authoritarian system struggling for a degree of rule of law 
undoubtedly constrains the scope of judicial reform.   
China prioritizes the supply side of the rule of law, but there has been a gradual 
shift to the demand side.  The supply side includes legal rules and the institutions that 
apply those legal rules with courts at the center. On the demand side, citizens are aware 
of  their rights  and the political-legal culture in a given society, and lawyers and social 
organizations channel disputes into legal institutions and facilitate protecting those rights.  
It is expected that in the beginning of building the rule of law, rulemaking, as a 
top-down process, has the priority. After all, rule of law requires that there are rules in 
existence to be enforced. Once the rules are made, it is often the case that those rules are 
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not properly enforced, and the rule of law appears to be superficial and lacks serious 
commitment. The second stage of reform is often about institutional capacity building. In 
general, in China, there is effective supply of rules and institutions but there is 
insufficient channeling between the world in which disputes have occurred and the world 
in which disputes can be resolved. A weak channeling function of the law appears to be a 
bottleneck in the Chinese law reform as in the case of other transition countries. 
17
As 
Epp18 has forcefully argued, what distinguishes a weak legal system, such as that in India, 
from a strong legal system, such as that in Canada, is not the rules or institutions of a 
respective country, but is what he refers to as the support structure, including principally 
the legal profession, NGOs and other intermediaries that play that channeling function. In 
building a legal system, empowering lawyers is as important as enhancing the capacity of 
judges. There cannot be a well functioning legal system without an effective and 
competent legal profession.         
Additionally, it is possible for authoritarian states to create an effective legal 
system which can respect freedom, protect rights and develop a degree of rule of law. 
The party state in China is adaptable, resilient and largely legitimate in the eyes of the 
general public, partly because it creates legal rights and has them enforced through a 
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judicial process in response to societal need. 
19
 But, like other transition states, China 
prioritizes rule of law and the protection of rights in selective policy areas depending on 
the perceived necessity and feasibility. Consistent with legal development in authoritarian 
societies, there is more rule of law in commerce and trade but less in media, religion, 
criminal law, and other politically sensitive areas.
20
 There are areas, such as anti-
corruption, in which the law remains largely silent. In general, the law is more effective 
and consequential in civil law rights or social-economic rights than political rights. 
Therefore, legal dualism co-exists. A professional justice serves for the vast majority of 
ordinary cases, and a politicized justice serves for a range of exceptional cases, as 
discussed below.  
That dualism has also caused a dilemma in the judiciary when facing cases of 
different political natures. For example, is the judiciary in China independent? This is not 
a meaningful question without referring to the particular context in which the question is 
posed. Any possible answer t would have to be case-specific, institution-specific and 
context-specific.21  In the Chinese case, courts are structurally dependent on China’s 
political system, and they are unlikely to gain any institutional independence as long as 
the existing political system remains. But, the courts can achieve a degree of operational 
independence in the actual adjudication of cases depending on the nature of cases 
involved. There will continue to be politically sensitive cases such as the corruption cases 
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involving political elites or cases concerning political dissent. In those exceptional cases, 
the courts will continue to depend on political instructions and defer to political order. 
However, in the vast majority of the cases relating civil and commercial matters, courts 
can be independent even within the authoritarian system. In ordinary civil and criminal 
justice matters, the concern is no longer judicial independence or the lack thereof, but 
accountability on the part of the judges and a smarter way of supervision and control. The 
CCP has shown little interest in interfering with ordinary civil and commercial disputes 
and is satisfied to leave their resolution to the courts. Once the concern over a lack of 
independence is taken out of the equation, an immediate question becomes whether the 
court has the institutional capacity to offer fair and effective resolution of the vast 
majority of ordinary cases.  With the support of the CCP to build a judiciary with 
integrity, the answer to the above question can be affirmative.  
That raises the final characteristic of the rule of law under authoritarianism, that is 
the lack of a deep moral commitment to limited government and liberty. In China, the 
reform promotes a thin (formal) version of the rule of law without asking the harder 
question of thick (substantive) version of the rule of law. The thin version of rule of law 
focuses on the internal quality of law, such as the requirement that law must be public, 
accessible, generally applicable, clear, prospective and consistent on the whole. The thin 
version also focuses on the institutional dimension of enforcement and requires valid 
rules for law-making, fair application of law, effective enforcement and general 
acceptance of rules.22 
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 Critics of the thin version of rule of law point out that it does not provide a 
normative foundation, and therefore “thin” because it is not supported by a rights-based 
system commonly observed in a liberal democracy. Legal reform in this context is largely 
illiberal; the legal system the CCP is building is not rights-based. Instead, reform efforts 
have been concentrated on developing a rule of law system to ensure certainty, clarity, 
and to some extent, procedural fairness. The law is used to improve government 
effectiveness and enhance state capacity and legitimacy. However, it does not restrain the 
CCP itself. As China has been institutionalizing, regularizing, and professionalizing their 
courts, but it is still encountering insurmountable difficulties inherent in the political 
system.            
 
Judicial Reform in China  
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese courts have undergone a continuous reform process of 
professionalization and institutionalization.
23
 Despite the political constraints, there are 
sufficient opportunities and incentives to continue China's judicial reform so as to 
enhance judicial capacity and rebuild trust and credibility. It is undeniable that the 
Chinese judiciary has been improving itself noticeably through enhancing 
professionalism, institutionalization and autonomy. 
The CCP has made efforts to make judgeships an attractive profession in 
comparison with other civil services. Indeed, a well-educated judiciary places its own 
demand on the quality of the judiciary and takes pride in its profession. When the quality 
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of the judicial remains unsatisfactory  , judges quit, adding internal pressure on the CCP 
to improve the judicial conditions.
24
 In response to the challenge, China has started a new 
round of judicial reform.
25
 Under the leadership of Zhou Qiang, the first Chief Justice 
who received formal legal education in the reform era, a prototype of a (further) reformed 
judiciary is slowly taking shape in Shanghai, Shenzhen and other key pilot cities. The 
core feature of this round of reform is the creation of a separate judicial track within the 
civil service. 
26
 
While the creation of a separate judicial track is important in boosting judicial 
morale, it is not intended to generate a sense of judicial independence. It is principally a 
financial incentive to rationalize and stabilize the judiciary.
27
 A separate judicial track 
creates more opportunities for career enhancement by decoupling salary and rank. 
Judges, like other civil servants, are facing a more acute problem. The administrative 
rank of a basic court, where the vast majority of judges in China work, was kept a low 
level and there were a large number of judges working in a low ranking station. Naturally 
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promotion opportunities were limited and, without promotion, salaries were capped. t was 
impossible for the vast majority of the judges to have their salary increased beyond a 
certain point. To deal with a large number of frustrated judges, the reform proposes a 
separate track of civil servants for judges separating  salary and rank so that there is 
salary increment without promotion in rank. In conclusion, the revised judicial track is a 
significant move in the context of a larger judicial reform. It will  boost judicial morale 
and strengthen judicial identity.   
Second, judging is now an institutionalized professional practice. After decades’ 
of incremental reforms, there are well-established judicial rules, procedures and practices 
that have accumulated within the Chinese judiciary. If a political ethic defined the courts 
in the Maoist China before 1980s, professionalism defines the judiciary in the reform 
period in spite of continuing attempts to politicize the court.
28
 The courts have been 
introducing reform measures since late 1970s, and those institutionalized practices have 
largely survived and proven to be resilient. With the exception of a range of politically 
sensitive cases, as mentioned below, courts have demonstrated the potentials to 
adjudicate cases fairly and effectively as the Chinese law requires. Even under the one 
Party framework, it is still possible most judicial decisions can offer a degree of certainty 
and predictability. This is possible because of the improved rule-making, rule-based 
decision-making, and the diminished role of corruption and bias in the process.
29
 In the 
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future, judging ordinary cases in China will look more like judging elsewhere, especially 
countries sharing a common legal tradition and at a similar level of prosperity. 
Third, within limits noted above, and as outlined more fully below, the court as an 
institution has become more autonomous in adjudicating cases and in designing 
accountability mechanisms. The limited degree of autonomy in judicial decisions comes 
in part from the inner desire of professionalized judges. With the further improvement of 
legal education and training, there will be a stronger and more distinct judicial identity.  
Ironically, autonomy also comes from the CCP. The Party’s attitude towards 
judicial decisions has evolved and, while there has been frequent and significant 
pushback against autonomy, the larger trend since the late 1970s has been one of 
increased autonomy in judicial decisions makings. The CCP itself has decided not to 
make decisions on individual cases and has passed resolutions to prohibit any improper 
influences on, and interference in, individual cases. The CCP has created a mechanism 
through which judicial personnel in charge of a case shall note and record any improper 
influence on that case and file a complaint  with the relevant disciplinary authorities.
30
 A 
similar mechanism has also been created to prohibit improper influences within legal 
institutions.
31
 While judicial independence in mature legal systems may depend on 
separation of powers, in China it has to rely principally on self-regulation and self-
discipline of the ruling Party.  
                                                                
30
 “Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa Huodong, Chashou Juti Anjian Chuli de Jilu, Tongbao he Zeren Zhuijiu 
Guiding” Yinfa («领导干部干预司法活动、插手具体案件处理的记录、通报和责任追究规定»), 
XINHUA NEWS, Mar. 30, 2015, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-03/30/c_1114812232.htm (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
31
 Zhongyang Zhengfa Wei Yinfa “Sifa Jiguan Neibu Renyuan Guowen Anjian de Jilu he Zeren Zhuijiu 
Guiding” (中央政法委印发«司法机关内部人员过问案件的记录和责任追究规定»), XINHUA NEWS, Mar. 30, 
2015, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/2015-03/30/c_1114812926.htm. 
16 
 
Judicial autonomy under the current reform is reflected in vertical and horizontal 
aspects. Vertically, the court is able to assert its institutional distinction in relation to 
other political and legal institutions, such as the police and procuratorate , in issues 
ranging from rule-making to individual decision-making.  It is common knowledge that 
China operates a police-centric criminal justice system. Police have a significantly higher 
political status than the procuratorate and the court.
32
 The police exercise broad legal 
powers in maintaining public order, carrying out criminal investigation, and imposing 
administrative penalties without effective judicial supervision. In criminal cases, the 
procuratorate and court largely defer on police investigative decisions.  
While there is police-centric structure remaining in operation, there are some 
optimistic early signs that the Party is prepared to shift the center of the criminal process 
from police investigation to court trial. If the 1979 Criminal Procedural Law (CPL) was 
successful in laying an institutional frame in regulating the exercising power in the 
criminal process, the 1996 and 2012 Amendments of the CPL, and the subsequent policy 
reforms, have created significant formal procedural constraints in the process. 
33
 These 
constraints have the potential to shift the gravitas of the criminal process gradually but 
forcefully to the courts. , In their reform agenda, the police have committed to a criminal 
process that centers on trials and are prepared to accept judicial scrutiny on matters 
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relating to torture and lawfulness of police evidence.34 This is a significant first step to 
take in developing judicial control over the entire criminal justice in China. For example, 
t he high profile judicial decision to find murder suspects not guilty for lack of evidence 
seems to show an increasing judicial strength and determination to act independently and 
forcefully against police decisions. 
35
    
Horizontally, the Party is removing the control of local governments of the courts 
by centralizing court financing and judicial appointments and re-defining jurisdictions. 
Given the difficulty the Party has facedin controlling defiance and resistance in the policy 
process, this reform seems a logical move to ensure local accountability and compliance 
with central decisions. As commonly observed, local protectionism is one of the 
significant barriers in developing rule of law in China and, when local courts are placed 
under local political control, they serve localized political and economic interests. 
36
    
There is a serious attempt to separate judges from management staff in the court 
on a permanent basis, so as to “de-bureaucratize” the judiciary and prioritize the role of 
trial judges in the adjudication process. With more power to make individual decisions, 
judges are also expected to shoulder more responsibilities. The enhanced accountability 
would necessarily reinforce judges’ fidelity to law and independent decision-making on 
the part of the judges. The reform highlights the real or perceived tension between judges 
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and their managers and the possibility of a diminished bureaucratic control within the 
courts.  Court presidents and other managing judges routinely design multiple measures 
to control judges in the judicial process. They shape not only the decision-making process 
but also the substance of the decisions. In general, managing judges are reluctant to allow 
other judges make decisions without prior approval on the ground that any relaxation in 
judicial control would lower the quality of court decisions. From this perspective, the real 
threat to judicial independence comes from the heart of the courts – those who have 
control over the decision-making process. 
37
 
There are of course frequent setbacks in the reform process. But it is important to 
note that regardless of the frequent setbacks, the Chinese judiciary has become noticeably 
different. Chinese judicial reform has been incremental in the sense that a reform 
program is often followed by a severe setback with some of the reform programs being 
rolled back. 
38
However, most of the institutional innovations and designs survive the 
setbacks. They gradually settle and then form part of the established practices with each 
reform episode adding a new element to judicial practice.   
 
A Dual Legal System in China’s Neo-authoritarianism 
What would be the best case scenario for fostering ethical integrity of the Chinese 
judiciary? Over time and because of the accumulative impact of the limited reform, there 
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will be a distinct judicial community with a common identity and interest. As previously 
stated, Chinese judges are better educated and trained in terms of the overall professional 
education, continuing judicial training, and knowledge of foreign practices and ideas. 
Judging will continue to be institutionalized in terms of more entrenched judicial 
formality, more specialist rules of procedure for adjudication and rigorous codes of 
conduct for judges. As a result, there will be an enhanced judicial authority as part of the 
legal process. The Chinese judiciary is likely to be more autonomous from other legal 
institutions and local political authorities.  
But the reform will continue to be carried out within the existing political 
framework. Rule of law and judicial professionalism are possible to the extent they may 
strengthen and legitimize the CCP's rule. Within that authoritarian context, even in the 
best case scenario, the court will continue to be submissive to the CCP and be compliant 
to its political demand. Political or otherwise “sensitive” cases will continue to exist in 
which the court will defer to the CCP’s wishes. Chinese courts will not be able to make 
public policies or strike down unconstitutional legislation or rule independently on 
politically charged cases. The court will play only a limited role in supervising the party 
state.   
The primary function of the court from this perspective is to offer efficient dispute 
resolution for the vast majority of individual cases, thereby fomenting social harmony 
and maintaining social stability – an essential political mission for courts in authoritarian 
states. To be effective for an institution that is politically weak, the judiciary must 
develop a sufficient degree of credibility that it is autonomous from political and social 
20 
 
influences, neutral to the parties before it, and fair in applying rules. China is likely to 
develop a judiciary that is politically submissive, but professionally capable of offering 
effective and fair legal solution to disputes. China’s judicial credibility will build 
principally on the professional standing of judges, transparency of the judicial process, 
the rule-based decision-making process, and, above all, the personal integrity of the 
judges. 
